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Abstract
Sequential mechanisms to solve matching problems are useful to promote (hidden) cooper-
ation between agents. Taking as a starting point the MIRC mechanism, employed in Spain
to match medical students and residency programs in privately owned hospitals, we find
that:
(1) In the current system, where the number of students that each program might enroll
is limited, the unique equilibrium allocation can be unstable.
(2) When the above limit is not (formally) imposed, instability is not expected to oc-
cur. Nevertheless, the multiplicity of equilibria shows that coordination failure might
emerge, generating a social welfare loss.
(3) When the role of students and hospitals is reversed in the MIRC mechanism, (hidden)
cooperation is guaranteed. Moreover, coordination failure disappears.
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1 Introduction
Some popular real-life matching mechanisms are described as hierarchical selection pro-
cedures. The aim of this paper is to shed some light on the open debates on how some
allocation mechanisms could be reformulated. This is the case of the Spanish MIR, the
internship program for graduating medical students, which annually matches over 6000
graduates with residency programs.
This allocation procedure can be described as follows. Each hospital announces how
many students can be admitted in each of its programs. Then students take a highly com-
petitive, comprehensive exam. Their score in such a exam has two consequences. First,
the public hospitals rank the student accordingly their scores,1 and second, the students se-
quentially select the program they want to join from those that still have vacancies, where
the order in which students are called to select their residency program coincides with that
obtained from their score in the exam. There are two additional elements that influence
the ability of each student to select a specific hospital, which are based on the distinction
of two classes of hospitals: public hospitals, handled by regional governments, and private
hospitals. The first restriction is determined by a rule that states that a student cannot se-
lect a medical specialty offered by some private hospital until all the positions offered by
public hospitals, in that specialty, have been filled.2 The second restriction comes from the
different interpretations of the two categories of hospitals of what is the residency aim, as
we describe below.
From the public hospitals’ point of view, residency is an important part of the educa-
tional system for graduating medical students. This implies that, in practice, each public
hospital must admit any student, unless all its positions have been filled; and all public hos-
pitals must rank all students according to a common scale, derived from their score in the
comprehensive exam. Therefore, given that the order in which students made choices is the
same as the common scale, the allocation of internship places (in public hospitals) is done
through a serial dictatorship procedure.3
The private hospitals perceive residencies as a training process for potential medical
staff, so their participation is not guided by mere educational reasons. In practice, this
implies that for a student to be enrolled in some of the private hospital residency programs,
1 As in the U.S., the score of this exam is a relevant proxy variable for the hospitals to rank different
students. In this matter, and related to the American system, Jayakumar (2016) states that “In the NRMP’s
2014 report, 94% of residency programs in all specialties reported that USMLE Step 1 scores were a factor in
selecting applicants to interview.” Our aim in the present paper is not related to any potential modification
in the USMLE motivated by the use that hospitals make from its score. Related to this recent debate, the
interested readers are directed to Prober et al. (2016), Jayakumar (2016) and Katsufrakis et al. (2016).
2 The 2016 call can be consulted at the Spanish Official Bulletin, September 13, 2016. The information
about the available places in private hospitals is gathered at p. 65761.
3Machado et al. (2012) analyze the MIR for public hospitals. They exploit the physicians’ hospital choices
to infer quality differentials among hospitals.
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it is necessary that the hospital explicitly consents to accept the student. Since, in addition,
some of the private hospitals are highly specialized in a few medical specialties,4 it is hardly
assumable a common ranking hypothesis for these hospitals. This is why in this paper we
assume that preferences exhibited by private hospital are not necessarily correlated.
In this paper, we concentrate on the MIR mechanism, applied to the private hospitals in
Spain, and a variant of this mechanism. This is what it is commonly known as “MIR with
consent”, and hereafter referred to as the MIRC mechanism.
A way to understand the relevance of the MIRC, related to the whole MIR system, comes
from the comparative between offered positions and the students demanding them. In
2014, the private institutions that participate in the MIRC offered 44 positions associated
to different medical and/or surgical specialties. This proposal caught the attention of a
relevant group of students. As a result of such an interest 1000 candidates were interviewed
to decide whether they qualify or not to obtain the hospital’s consent to be a candidate.5
Such a high demand is partially explained by the long-standing tradition and prestige of the
hospital participating in the MIRC.
The mechanisms for (two-sided) matching problems studied in the literature associate
polar roles to agents belonging to the two groups of involved agents, namely institutions
(symbolized in this paper as hospitals) and individuals (exemplified here by students). The
agents on one side of the market play an active role because they propose matching agree-
ments to their potential mates, while the agents in the opposite side play a passive role
because they just evaluate the offers they have received, and then either accept or reject
each of these proposals. Therefore, associated to each matching mechanism, we can de-
scribe its dual by exchanging the roles of the agents on the two sides. According to this idea
of duality in matching mechanisms, we not only study the consequences of maintaining the
MIRC mechanism, but we also analyze the agents’ behavior when faced with the dual of the
MIRC mechanism, which we call the DMIRC mechanism.
Since the mechanisms that we analyze in this paper are sequential, to study the agents’
behavior when faced to these mechanisms we concentrate on their Subgame Perfect Nash
Equilibria. This simplifies our analysis because the agents in one side of the market (either
students when faced to the MIRC mechanism, or hospitals if faced to the DMIRC mechanism)
have a dominant strategy. Therefore each of these games can be reduced to a game where
the agents not having a dominant strategy play simultaneously (Baron and Kalai, 1993). We
then concentrate in the Nash equilibria of these games that survive to an iterative discarding
of dominated strategies.
Our main conclusion is that the DMIRC mechanism implements the Student-Optimal
Stable allocation. Beyond theoretical research, this result has some policy implications.
4For instance, the Barraquer Ophthalmology Center only offers a residency program in ophthalmology,
whereas the CETIR Medical Center only offers a program in nuclear medicine.
5This information is extracted from the Redacción Médica’s web page, accessed on 04/09/2017.
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The MIRC mechanism must be given up in favor of the DMIRC mechanism. This assertion
is sustained because by keeping the MIRC mechanism there is no guarantee that, in equilib-
rium, the outcome is stable, whereas by adopting the DMIRC, there is only one equilibrium
allocation: the stable matching which is optimal from the students’ point of view. Our re-
sults also contribute to an open debate on which algorithm should be adopted by the NRMP
(see Williams, 1995), which led to the adoption of the Student-Optimal Stable Matching
mechanism in 1998 (see Section 6.1).
1.1 Related Literature
Since Gale and Shapley (1962), stability of the outcome has been a central requirement
for many matching mechanisms to be adopted.6 Stability implicitly entails the existence
of cooperation among agents. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Roth (1982), when agents
are faced with stable matching mechanisms, there are always some agents that can benefit
from misrepresenting their true characteristics. The impossibility result by Roth (1982) has
motivated the growth of a literature exploring matching mechanisms and the outcomes that
are attained in equilibrium.
When agents’ decisions are taken simultaneously, Ma (1995) illustrates how the agents’
collusion, when selecting their strategies, induces the stability of the equilibrium outcomes;
Alcalde (1996) shows how the lack of agents’ coordination might induce unstable alloca-
tions; and Pycia (2012) points out that any stable allocation can be decentralized through a
collusive equilibrium. Summarizing, the literature points out that a collusive selection of the
actions taken by the agents seems to be necessary and sufficient to attain stable outcomes.
In other words, strategic cooperation should be explicit, rather than hidden, to attain stable
outcomes.
Nevertheless, the literature also provides two (non-exclusive) escape routes to obtain
stable outcomes without requiring the strategic collusion of agents when faced with the
mechanism. In such a case we say that the agents’ cooperation is hidden.
The first approach to reach this hidden cooperation comes from considering that ei-
ther agents exhibit some rationalizable strategic behavior (Bernheim, 1984; Pearce, 1984),
or they iteratively discard dominated strategies reaching a sophisticated equilibrium (Far-
quharson, 1969; Moulin, 1979). Alcalde (1996) shows that the Deferred Acceptance mech-
anism is dominance solvable. This result was extended by Ma (2010) for the Student Op-
timal Stable Matching mechanism, when students play truncated strategies. The results
by Alcalde (1996) and Ma (2010) add a further insight to the description of the agents’
behavior. Since there is only one equilibrium allocation, which can be obtained by easy-to-
identify strategies, we can also suggest that agents exhibit coordination when facing the
mechanism, which helps to avoid the utility loses associated with a possible mismatch.
6See, e.g., Abdulkadirog˘lu and Sönmez (2003), Roth (2003, 2008) or Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2009).
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The second approach comes from the design of sequential mechanisms, and the pre-
diction of agents’ decisions via backward induction. In this context, Alcalde and Romero-
Medina (2000) show that stable equilibrium allocations can be obtained without agents’
strategic collusion. In a close framework, Alcalde et al. (1998) illustrate how the sequen-
tiality in which agents decide also helps to attain stable configurations in job matching
markets (Kelso and Crawford, 1982), with variable wages. Triossi (2009) introduces sunk
costs in sequential mechanisms. He shows that stable equilibrium allocations are obtained.
Haeringer and Wooders (2011) also explore the relationship between sequentiality in the
agents’ decision and the stability of the equilibrium outcomes.
Sequentiality has also been employed by some other authors as a tool to reach the agents’
cooperation. For instance, Sotomayor (2003) explores the design of (non-revelation) se-
quential mechanisms for the marriage problem implementing stable allocations. The idea
she underlines has been recently extended by Romero-Medina and Triossi (2014) to the
more general case of many-to-one matching framework. The mechanisms explored by
Romero-Medina and Triossi (2014) exhibit some similarities with the ones we introduce
in the present paper. Nevertheless, our analysis of the agents’ behavior differs from that
developed by Romero-Medina and Triossi (2014).
In the mechanisms proposed in the present paper, the agents exhibiting the “passive role”
have a dominant strategy, namely to accept the best proposal the receive. This reduces the
mechanisms to one-stage games where the players are agents on the “active side of the
market.” In this reduced game the outcome function associates each profile of strategies
with the best-response selection that agents in the “passive side of the market” ought to do.
Therefore, in our analysis, we focus on Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium, applying a back-
ward induction argument. To refine the equilibria, we apply a notion of stage-undominated
strategies in the first stage. Similar arguments are employed in Baron and Kalai (1993),
Austen-Smith and Banks (2005, Section 4.1), or Alcalde and Dahm (2016) among others.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the framework and
presents the main standard concepts. The MIRC mechanism is introduced in Section 3. In
particular, Subsection 3.1 points out the main problems exhibited by the current Spanish
system, which allocates medical students to residency programs. It is shown that the MIRC
mechanism might not have any stable equilibrium allocation. Therefore, we concentrate
on the analysis of its dual, the DMIRC mechanism and this is the aim of Section 4.1. We
demonstrate that the DMIRC mechanism helps to conciliate (hidden) cooperation as well
as coordination between agents. For completeness, Section 5 studies a slight modification
of the MIRC mechanism, where students are not constrained when a hospital’s quota is
exceeded. It is shown (Section 5.1) that each stable allocation can be supported through an
equilibrium. Finally, Section 6 states our main conclusions, as well as suggestions for future
research. For presentation convenience, all the proofs, as well as some auxiliary results, are
relegated to the Appendix.
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2 The Model and Main Definitions
There are two finite, disjoint sets of agents, namely S = {s1, . . . , si, . . . , sn} denoting the set of
students; and the set of hospitals, H =

h1, . . . ,h j, . . . ,hm
	
. Associated to hospital h j there
is an integer q j ≥ 1 indicating the maximal number of students it can enroll, and it is named
its quota.
Each student si has a strict, complete, transitive, and asymmetric preference relation i
over H ∪ {si}.7 Given a set of options for student si, say A⊆ H ∪ {si}, B (A;i) denotes her
maximal on A under preferences i. In the case of hospitals, each h j has a strict, complete,
transitive, and asymmetric preference relation j over the possible sets of students 2S. Given
a set of students S′ ⊆ S, and hospital h j, Ch
 
S′, j

denotes h j choice on S
′ according to
 j, i.e. S′′ = Ch
 
S′, j

whenever (i)S′′ ⊆ S′ and, (ii) for each bS ⊆ S′, bS 6= S′′, S′′  j bS. For
agent x ∈ S∪H, ¥x denotes its/her weak preferences; i.e. y ¥x z means that either y x z
or y = z.
Throughout the paper, we assume that agents, as well as the quota of each hospital, are
given. Therefore, a specific problem can be described through the agents’ preferences, P =
(¥x)x∈H∪S. A solution for P, also called a matching, is a correspondence µ : S ∪H  S ∪H
such that
(a) for each student si, µ (si) ∈ H ∪ {si};
(b) for each hospital h j, µ
 
h j
 ⊆ S; and
(c) for each student-hospital pair
 
si,h j

, µ (si) = h j if and only if si ∈ µ
 
h j

.
Given a problem P, we say that matching µ is
(1) Individually Rational if
(i) no student prefers her being unmatched option rather than the hospital she is
assigned to under µ, if any; i.e., there is no student si such that si i µ (si); and
(ii) no hospital prefers not to enroll some of the students it has been assigned; i.e.
for each hospital h j, µ
 
h j

= Ch
 
µ
 
h j

, j

.
(2) Stable if it is individually rational and there is no hospital h j and (non-empty) set of
students S′ such that
(i) for each student si ∈ S′, h j i µ (si); and
(ii) S′ ⊆ Ch  µ  h j∪ S′, j.
7 When student si prefers not to be enrolled to any residency program rather than being attached to hospital
h j , it is denoted by si i h j . This is why si is also referred as the “being unmatched option” for student si .
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A pair
 
h j,S
′ which satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) above is said to block matching
µ.
An individually rational matching which is not blocked by any student-hospital pair is
called Pairwise Stable.
For a given problem P, IR (P) denotes the set of its individually rational matchings; PC (P)
is the set of its pairwise stable matchings; and C (P) denotes the set of its stable matchings.
It is well-known that for any given problem P, C (P) ⊆ PC (P), whereas the opposite is
not true. Moreover, there are some instances with no pairwise stable allocation, and thus
no stable matching.
Roth (1984, 1985) explored the possibility of finding environments where all the prob-
lems have stable allocations. Roth (1984) shows that whenever the hospitals preferences
satisfy substitutability, a stable matching always exists. Roth (1985) studies the case where
the hospitals preferences satisfy responsiveness, a property guaranteeing the existence of sta-
ble matchings, which connects each hospital opinion on isolated students with its opinion
over different sets of students.
Definition 1 [Substitutability]
Preferences for hospital h j,  j, satisfy substitutability when for each set of students S′ ⊆ S,
if si ∈ Ch
 
S′, j

, then si ∈ Ch
 
S′ \ {s`} , j

for each s` 6= si.
A problem P is said to be substitutable if the preferences of all the hospitals satisfy substi-
tutability.
Definition 2 [Responsiveness]
Let h j be a hospital with quota q j. We say that its preferences  j satisfy responsiveness if
the following holds.
(i) For each S′ ⊆ S, Ch  S′, j≤ q j;8
(ii) for each S′ ⊂ S, with |S′| < q j and any two students si and s` not in S′, S′ ∪ {si}  j
S′ ∪ {s`} if, and only if {si}  j {s`}; and
(iii) for each S′ ⊆ S, with |S′| ≤ q j and any student si ∈ S′, si ∈ Ch
 
S′, j

if, and only if,
{si}  j ;.
A problem P is said to be responsive if the preferences of all the hospitals satisfy responsive-
ness. Under responsiveness, the following results hold.
Lemma 1 Let P be a responsive problem, then PC (P) = C (P) 6= ;.
8 Given a set T , |T | denotes its cardinality.
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Lemma 2 Let P be a responsive problem. Then, there is a matching µSO ∈ C (P) such that
for each si ∈ S and µ ∈ C (P), µSO (si)¥i µ (si). Such an allocation is known as the Student-
Optimal Stable matching.
Lemma 3 Let P be a responsive problem. Then, there is a matching µHO ∈ C (P) such that
for each h j ∈ H and µ ∈ C (P), µHO
 
h j

¥ j µ
 
h j

. Such an allocation is known as the
Hospital-Optimal Stable matching.
Lemmata 1 and 2 were proven in Roth (1984) for the case where hospitals’ preferences
satisfy substitutability. Since responsiveness implies substitutability, the results are still valid
within this framework. Lemma 3 is borrowed from Roth (1985).
It is usual to assume that hospitals’ preferences are responsive; nevertheless, some of
our results are still valid without such an assumption.
3 The MIRC Mechanism
In this section we describe how the MIRC mechanism operates. We further develop a formal
analysis of which outcomes are likely to occur when agents behave strategically.
This is an (n+ 1)-stage game. At the initial stage, each hospital announces a (possibly
empty) set of students, which is interpreted as the students that eventually might be en-
rolled by this hospital. These announcements are made simultaneously. Then, each student
selects, according to a given hierarchic ordering, the hospital whose internship program
she wants to attend, provided that she meets the eligibility restrictions already determined
by hospitals. For simplicity of presentation, we assume that students’ decisions are made
according their label.9 Therefore, student s1 chooses a program among the hospitals declar-
ing her as ‘enrollable’, if any; then, student s2 makes her choice from the hospitals declaring
their ability to enroll her, and having a vacancy once s1 request has been handled; and so
on. We formally describe the MIRC mechanism.
Definition 3 [The MIRC Mechanism]
The MIRC mechanism is the following sequential game, with n+1 stages. The set of players
is S ∪H. Actions are selected according to these (sequential) rules:
(0) Each hospital h j selects an action σ j ⊆ S. This selection is simultaneously made by all
the hospitals. This information becomes public before proceeding to the next stage.
(1) Student s1, taking into account the actions already taken by all the hospitals, chooses
her action a1 ∈

h j ∈ H : s1 ∈ σ j
	∪{s1}. Then, s1 is matched to a1; i.e. µMIRC (s1) = a1.
This information becomes publicly known by the remaining students.
9 Otherwise, relabel the students, and the description will be similar once this relabeling is done.
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. . .
(`) Student s`, taking into account the actions taken by all the hospitals and the students
preceding her, chooses her action a` ∈ H ′ ∪ {s`}, where hospital h j ∈ H ′ if, and only
if, s` ∈ σ j, and
si ∈ {s1, . . . , s`−1} : ai = h j	 < q j. Then, s` is matched to a`; i.e.,
µMIRC (s`) = a`. The remaining students are publicly informed about this.
Once all the agents have selected their actions, matching µMIRC is obtained, as described
through stages (1) to (n) above.
3.1 Strategic Behavior and the MIRC Mechanism
We now concentrate on exploring how agents will act when faced with the MIRC mechanism.
Note that, given the actions selected by the hospitals in stage (0), it is easy to determine
which action each student ought to select.
Let A (s1 |σ ) be set of achievable options for student s1, when the actions chosen by the
hospitals are σ =
 
σ1, . . . ,σ j, . . . ,σm

; that is,
A (s1 |σ ) =

h j ∈ H : s1 ∈ σ j
	∪ {s1} .
Therefore, the best-response of s1 to the hospitals’ actions is to choose a
∗
1 (σ) =
B (A (s1 |σ ) ;1). Note that the selection of a∗1 (σ) as her best available option does not
depend on what the other students could eventually select. Moreover, for each given com-
bination of hospitals’ actions, say σ, when s1 selects her best-response, µ
MIRC (s1) = a∗1 (σ).
An iterative argument helps to determine the best-response of si to her predecessors’ ac-
tions, provided that all the students preceding her have already selected their best-response.
In such a case a hospital, say h j, is available for si whenever this hospital declares that si is
an admissible student, and its positions are not yet exhausted; i.e.,
(a) si ∈ σ j, and
(b)
s` ∈ {s1, . . . , si−1} : a∗` (σ) = h j	< q j.
Let A (si |σ ) be the set containing all the hospitals available for si, as already described,
and her being unmatched option, si. Note that the arguments above, related to s1, can be
replicated to show that si ’ best-response to her predecessors’ actions is to select a
∗
i (σ) =
B (A (si |σ ) ;i), inducing that µMIRC (si) = a∗i (σ).
Following Baron and Kalai (1993), a reasonable way to predict how the agents will
react to the MIRC mechanism is by assuming that hospitals exhibit perfect foresight on
what students will select, and thus concentrating on the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria
with stage-undominated strategies. Our framework, and taking into account the reasoning
above about students’ best-responses, allows us to reduce the sequential game previously
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described to a simpler one-stage game. In this game the players are the hospitals; a strategy
for each hospital is a (possibly empty) set of students, and thus the strategy space for each
hospital coincides with its set of actions in the MIRC mechanism. The outcome associated to
each profile of strategies is the outcome of the MIRC mechanism when each hospital action
coincides with the strategy in this game and each student’s action is her best-response to her
predecessors’ actions, as previously described. Let Γ HR denote this hospital-reduced game.
In what follows, and abusing notation, µHR (σ) denotes the matching obtained when
the hospitals, faced with Γ HR, play the vector of (pure) strategies σ. For agent x ∈ S ∪ H,
µHR (x;σ) is what the above matching assigns to this agent.
Given the vector of strategiesσ and hospital h j,

σ− j,σ′j

denotes the vector of strategies
obtained from σ by replacing this hospital strategy by σ′j instead of σ j.
A strategy σ j is said to be dominated for hospital h j at game Γ
HR if there is another
strategy for it, say σ′j, such that (a) for each vector of strategies for the remaining hospitals,
say σ− j, µHR

h j;

σ− j,σ′j

¥ j µHR
 
h j;
 
σ− j,σ j

; and (b) there is a vector of strategies
for the remaining hospitals, say σ′− j such that µ
HR

h j;

σ′− j,σ
′
j
  j µHR h j;σ′− j,σ j.
Strategy σ j is an undominated strategy for hospital h j at game Γ
HR whenever no strategy
dominates it.
An equilibrium for Γ HR is a vector strategies σ∗ =

σ∗1, . . . ,σ
∗
j , . . . ,σ
∗
m

such that for
each hospital h j and strategy for it, σ j
µHR
 
h j;σ
∗¥ j µHR h j;σ∗− j,σ j .
When faced with Γ HR, some of the available strategies for each hospital might be domi-
nated. Assuming that rational hospitals are not expected to play dominated strategies, Γ HR
should be redefined throughout the elimination, for each hospital, of its dominated strate-
gies. Since at the new, restricted game any hospital might have dominated strategies (that
were undominated in the original game), an iterative process of eliminating dominated
strategies yields a reduced set of strategies for each player, say ΣFj , in which no strategy is
dominated. An equilibrium σ∗ is said to be sophisticated whenever the strategy selected
by each hospital belongs to its (reduced) set of strategies obtained by iterative elimination
of dominated strategies, ΣFj .
We now deal with the strategic analysis of Γ HR. We first see that any stable matching can
be decentralized through an equilibrium when agents are faced with the MIRC mechanism.
We want to stress that Proposition 1 below does not require that the hospitals’ preferences
are responsive. The only necessary condition is the existence of a stable allocation. More-
over, this result specifies the actions that should be taken by the hospitals, revealing that
a high level of coordination is needed to reach the equilibrium. Our second result, Propo-
sition 2, establishes that under responsiveness only individual rational matchings can be
supported as equilibrium outcomes. But nothing can be guaranteed about the stability of
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the equilibrium outcomes. This result is complemented with Example 1 which definitively
suggests that the MIRC mechanism must be given up.
Proposition 1 Let P be a problem, and µ be a stable matching for P. Then, the profile of
strategies σ∗ such that, for each hospital h j, σ∗j = µ
 
h j

constitutes an equilibrium for Γ HR.
Moreover, µHR (σ∗) = µ.
Proposition 2 Let P be a responsive problem, and Γ HR the hospital-reduced game associ-
ated to this problem. Ifσ∗ is an equilibrium for Γ HR, then µHR (σ∗) is an individually rational
matching for P.
Unfortunately, as the next example points out, there might be some equilibrium support-
ing unstable allocations. Such instability is the cost of the hospitals’ admissibility restrictions
induced by their quota.10
Example 1 Let us consider the following instance involving three students, S = {a, b, c},
and two hospitals H = {1, 2}, with q1 = 2 and q2 = 1. Hospitals preferences are responsive,
and the description of the agents’ preferences is11
a := 1, 2 1 =: b, a, c
b := 2, 1 2 =: a, b, c
c := 1, 2
It can be seen that this problem has a unique stable matching, bµ, which is described by
bµ := ¨ a b c
1 2 1
.
According to Proposition 1 above, this matching can be decentralized through an equi-
librium for Γ HR, namely bσ, with bσ1 = {a, c} and bσ2 = {b}. Nevertheless, it is difficult to
justify that hospital 2 might select strategy bσ2. This is because such a strategy is a dom-
inated strategy for this hospital. To be precise, let us consider strategies σ∗2 = {a, b, c},
σ∗∗2 = {a, b}, and any σ′2 /∈

σ∗2,σ
∗∗
2
	
. It can be seen that, for any strategy σ1 played by
hospital 1,
µHR
 
2;
 
σ1,σ
∗
2

= µHR
 
2;
 
σ1,σ
∗∗
2

= {b}¥2 µHR
 
2;
 
σ1,σ
′
2

if a ∈ σ1, whereas
µHR
 
2;
 
σ1,σ
∗
2

= µHR
 
2;
 
σ1,σ
∗∗
2

= {a} 2 µHR
 
2;
 
σ1,σ
′
2

if a /∈ σ1.
10 See Theorem 2 in Section 5.1.
11 Since hospitals’ preferences are responsive, given their quotae, the only information that we need re-
lated to the hospitals’ preferences is how each hospital compares any pair of students, as well as which are
admissible. This also applies to Example 2.
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Then, provided that hospital 2 ought to select one strategy in

σ∗2,σ
∗∗
2
	
, the set of stu-
dents {a, b} is no longer available for hospital 1. But hospital 1 can obtain {b, c}, which
turns out to be its best available set of students provided that it cannot enroll {a, b}. This
objective is only reached by selecting σ∗1 = {b, c} because for any σ2 ∈

σ∗2,σ
∗∗
2
	
, and each
σ1 6= σ∗1,
µHR
 
1;
 
σ∗1,σ2

= {b, c} 1 µHR (1; (σ1,σ2)) .
Note that, using the terminology by Moulin (1979), Γ HR is dominance solvable for prob-
lem P. Thus, the only equilibria supported by the agents’ rationalizable strategic behavior
are σ∗ =
 
σ∗1,σ
∗
2

and σ∗∗ =
 
σ∗1,σ
∗∗
2

, yielding matching
µHR (σ∗) = µHR (σ∗∗) =
¨
a b c
2 1 1
,
which fails to be stable for problem P since the pair (1, a) blocks µHR (σ∗).

4 The Dual MIRC Mechanism
In this section we explore the consequences of a slight reformulation of the MIRC mech-
anism. Our proposal here can be seen as a reform similar to the one which took place in
the USA in 1998, when the NMRP moved from a Hospital-Optimal Stable matching mech-
anism to a Resident-Optimal Stable matching mechanism. This reform involved switching
the roles of hospitals and students in the description of the mechanism: Hospitals that,
previously were the agents making proposals, become the proposal-receivers; whereas the
students, that were the agents receiving proposals, become the proposer-agents.
In this section we develop a game-theoretical analysis for the mechanism being dual to
the Spanish MIR with Consent, where such a duality should be understood as the switch in
the agents’ roles.12Summarizing the results of the previous section and those of the present
section, a reform in the allocation system employed in Spain, by adopting the Dual of the
MIRC mechanism, would be undertaken.
We now proceed to give a formal definition for the Dual MIRC mechanism, DMIRC
mechanism in short. This is a (m+ 1)-stage game involving students -who simultaneously
select an action at the initial stage- and hospitals -whose action is decided sequentially
according to an exogenously given hierarchical order-. For simplicity of presentation we
assume that hospitals choose the students they enroll in their programs according to their
labels.
12Strictly speaking, a dual formulation of the MIRC mechanism requires that, in the first step, each student
selects only one hospital. Here we assume that each student can select as many hospitals as she wants. We
are grateful to a referee for pointing out this fact.
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Definition 4 [The DMIRC Mechanism]
The DMIRC mechanism is the following sequential game, with m + 1 stages. The set of
players is S ∪H. Actions are selected according to the following (sequential) rules:
(0) Each student si selects an action δi ⊆ H ∪ {si}. This selection is simultaneously made
by all the students. This information becomes public before proceeding to the next
stage.
(1) Hospital h1, taking into account the actions already taken by all the students, decides
its own action aD1 ⊆ {si ∈ S : h1 ∈ δi}. Then, h1 is assigned all the students in aD1 ;
i.e., µDMIRC (h1) = aD1 . This information becomes publicly known by the remaining
hospitals.
. . .
(`) Hospital h`, taking into account the actions taken by all the students and the hospitals
preceding it, chooses its action aD
`
⊆ {si : h` ∈ δi}\∪ j<`
¦
aDj
©
. Then, µDMIRC (h`) = aD` .
This information becomes publicly known by the remaining hospitals.
For the sake of completeness, any student si who is not assigned a hospital after stage m is
unmatched (i.e., µDMIRC (si) = si for each such student).
The intuitive description of how the DMIRC mechanism operates is very simple. At the
initial stage each student declares which hospitals (if any) are acceptable from her point
of view. Then, hospital h1 selects a set of students among the ones declaring that h1 is
acceptable. Students selected by h1 are enrolled to h1, and thus they are no longer available
for the remaining hospitals. For the other hospitals the argument is similar, just taking into
account that for a student to be achievable it is not only necessary that she declares that
the hospital is acceptable for her, but also that the student has not already been assigned to
another hospital.
4.1 Strategic Behavior and the DMIRC Mechanism
A similar reasoning to that developed in Section 3.1 allows us to predict which action
ought to be selected by each hospital when faced with the DMIRC mechanism. Given
δ = (δ1, . . . ,δi, . . . ,δn), the vector of actions taken by all the students, the set of achiev-
able students for hospital h1 is
AD (h1 |δ ) = {si ∈ S : h1 ∈ δi} .
The best-response by h1 to the actions selected by the students is to choose a
D∗
1 (δ) =
Ch
 
AD (h1 |δ ) ;1

. Note that when h1 selects its best-response action it enrolls the stu-
dents in aD∗1 (δ) = µ
DMIRC (h1). This decision only depends on the actions taken by the
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students and thus it is independent of the actions that the remaining hospitals ought to
eventually select. This action is then observed by the remaining hospitals.
An iterative argument on how the hospitals act allows us to anticipate that when h` has
to select its action, given δ and assuming that the hospitals preceding it have selected their
best-response to their preceding agents, then the set of available students for h` is
AD (h` |δ ) = {si ∈ S : h` ∈ δi} \ ∪`−1j=1aD∗j (δ) .
It is reasonable to expect that rational students anticipate that each hospital will select its
best-response action to the actions chosen by its predecessors. This fact allows identification
of the outcomes that result from agents’ interaction when faced with the DMIRC mechanism
with those of the student-reduced game Γ SR where players are the students, a strategy for
each player is a set of hospitals, and the outcome associated to profile of strategies δ, to
be denoted as µSR (δ), is the outcome of the DMIRC mechanism where the actions by the
students are the strategies selected in Γ SR, whereas each hospital action is its best response
to its predecessors’ actions as already described.
We now study which outcomes are likely when agents are faced with the DMIRC mech-
anism. To reach our objective, we concentrate on the equilibria for game Γ SR.13
Our first concern relies on the more general case where no structure is assumed for
the hospital preferences. Therefore, Proposition 3 below extends the analysis performed
in Romero-Medina and Triossi (2014) related to their Students Apply College Sequentially
Choose mechanism. This result establishes that each stable allocation can be decentralized
through some equilibrium. Thus, the similarities between Propositions 1 and 3 agree with
the duality of the DMIRC and the MIRC mechanisms.
Proposition 3 Let P be a problem, and µ be a pairwise-stable matching for P. Then, profile
of strategies δ∗ such that, for each student si, δ∗i = µ (si) constitutes an equilibrium for Γ
SR.
Corollary 1 Let P be a problem, and µ be a stable matching for P. Then, there is an equi-
librium δ∗ for Γ SR such that µSR (δ∗) = µ.
As argued in Example 1, it is difficult to assume that students select dominated strategies
when playing game Γ SR. Nevertheless, the strategies proposed in Proposition 3, might be
dominated for some of the students. It can be shown that, despite what Proposition 3
reports, some stable outcomes might not be supported by any equilibrium when students
exhibit a sophisticated behavior (Farquharson, 1969).
13 The notions of equilibrium and sophisticated equilibrium for Γ SR are similar to the ones introduced in
Section 3.1 for game Γ HR, just taking into account that players in the former game are students, whereas
hospitals are the players in Γ HR.
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Our first concern about the students’ behavior is related to how strategies can be disre-
garded based on dominance arguments; in particular when, for each student, there might
be several strategies being equivalent.14
For game Γ SR there are some undominated strategies that are rarely selected by the
students. The reason is that they are protectively dominated strategies (see Definition 5
below).
The next example helps to illustrate the idea captured by protective domination.
Example 2 Consider the following 6-student-3-hospital responsive problem, with S =
{a, b, c, d, e, f }, H = {1,2, 3}, and q j = 2 for each h j ∈ H. Agents’ preferences are
a := 3,2, 1 d := 2, 3,1 1 =: a, b, c, d, e, f
b := 2,3, 1 e := 3, 2,1 2 =: c, e, a, b, d, f
c := 3,2, 1  f := 2, 3,1 3 =: d, f , b, a, e, c
Assume that, when students play game Γ SR, students c and e play strategy δ∗c = δ
∗
e = {2}
and students d and f play δ∗d = δ
∗
f = {3}. Then, for any strategies played by a and b, say δ∗a
and δ∗b respectively, µ
SR (a;δ∗) ∈ {1, a}. To be precise, a = µSR (a;δ∗) when 1 /∈ δ∗a, whereas
1 = µSR (a;δ∗) whenever 1 ∈ δ∗a. Since 1 a a, this implies that strategy δ∗a = {1} is not
dominated by any strategy not containing hospital 1.
Taking into account that hospital 1 is the first hospital to select which students it enrolls,
and that a is its preferred student, µSR (a;δ) = 1 for each profile of strategies δ such that
{1} ⊆ δa. That is, for student a, all the strategies including hospital 1 are equivalent when
playing Γ SR. Therefore, δa = {1} is an undominated strategy. 
Taking into account the instance above, proposed in Example 2, is it reasonable to predict
that some of the students declare to be admissible only their less preferred hospital, not
including any additional admissible option? Note that the argument in this example can
also be replicated for any problem including as many hospitals as wanted! Since no student
incurs any cost by listing more hospitals, it does not seem to be a common behavior. How
could we explain that no student is expected to list only her worst acceptable hospital?
A justification comes from the analysis of how, in real-life situations, sequential proce-
dures are implemented. Assume that, at the very beginning, the order in which the hospitals
select the students they enroll is established. In practice, there is a deadline at which each
hospital has to settle its decision. If a hospital delays, it is not excluded, but it is relegated
to be the last hospital to decide. No hospital has any interest in being delayed, but there is
a small (positive) probability that some hospital incurs a delay situation, so that the order
14 Two strategies are said to be equivalent for a given student whenever her outcome is the same, no matter
which of the two strategies is selected, for any profile of strategies selected by her rivals. For the case of Γ SR,
δi and δ
′
i are equivalent for student si whenever for any δ−i played by the other students, µSR (si; (δ−i ,δi)) =
µSR
 
si;
 
δ−i ,δ′i

.
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in which the hospitals made their selections might be altered. Taking into account that such
an alteration of the initial order might occur, even with a small probability, it is reasonable
that students try to protect against the effects of such a possibility. This protection might be
reached by including additional ‘admissible’ hospitals.
Before formally defining protective domination, we need some additional notation. Let
pi : {1, . . . , j, . . . ,m} → {1, . . . , j, . . . ,m} a permutation of the hospitals. For a given permu-
tation pi, Γ SR
pi
is the student-reduced game associated to the DMIRC mechanism where the
hospitals select according to pi.15 µSR
pi
(δ) is the matching that Γ SR
pi
determines when students
play the profile of strategies δ.
Definition 5 Let P be a given problem and Γ SR its associated student-reduced game. We say
that δi protectively dominates δ
′
i for student si if for any strategies for the other students
δ−i, and each permutation of the hospitals pi
µSR
pi
(si; (δ−i,δi))¥i µSRpi
 
si;
 
δ−i,δ′i

,
and there is a profile of strategies for the other students δ∗−i and a permutation pi
∗ such that
µSR
pi∗
 
si;
 
δ∗−i,δi
i µSRpi∗  si;  δ∗−i,δ′i .
Remark 1 Note that the domination of strategy δi by δ
′
i, for student si, is protective when
there is a source of stochastic domination when comparing the hospitals that si can achieve
for any given strategy by the other students, provided that the order in which the hospitals
choose their students is selected at random, once the students have decided their strategies.
A similar reasoning to that employed to an iterative deletion of dominated strategies,
and the definition of sophisticated equilibrium in Section 3.1, allows us to introduce the
notion of protectively sophisticated equilibrium below.
Provided that no student selects protectively dominated strategies, we can reduce the
set of strategies for each student to the ones not being protectively dominated. An iterative
deletion of protectively dominated strategies allows us to determine, for each student, a
set of strategies in which no remaining strategy is protectively dominated, provided that
no student plays protectively dominated strategies. Let ΣPF the set of profiles of strategies
obtained by iterative deletion of protective dominated strategies. We say that δ∗ ∈ ΣPF is a
protectively sophisticated equilibrium, PSE in short, whenever for each student si and any
strategy for her δi ∈ ΣPFi ,
µSR (si;δ
∗)¥i µSR
 
si;
 
δ∗−i,δi

.
15 pi ( j) denotes the turn of h j; i.e. if, for instance pi ( j) = 3, then h j is the third hospital that chooses the
students it enrolls. As assumed through this paper, Γ SR stands for the game Γ SRpi in which pi is the identity
permutation, pi ( j) = j for each j.
15
We now introduce the main result in this section. It establishes that, under responsive-
ness, any equilibrium remaining after an iterative deletion of protectively dominated strate-
gies decentralizes the Student-Optimal Stable matching. Therefore, this result points out
how the DMIRC mechanism helps to achieve (hidden) cooperation as well as coordination
between agents.
Theorem 1 Let P be a responsive problem, and Γ SR be the student-reduced game associated
to P. Then, Γ SR has a protectively sophisticated equilibrium. Moreover, for each PSE for Γ SR,
say δ∗, µSR (δ∗) is the Student-Optimal Stable matching for problem P, µSO.
Although the Appendix proposes a formal proof of Theorem 1, we illustrate below why
this result holds as the consequence of two facts, whose precise statement is relegated to
the Appendix. These facts are:
(a) Lemma 4: If δ∗ is an equilibrium for Γ SR, then µSR (δ∗) is a stable matching for the
original responsive problem P;
(b) Lemma 7: Given the responsive problem P, let µSO be its Student-Optimal Stable
matching. Then, when protectively dominated strategies are iteratively deleted, the
set of remaining strategies for each student, say ΣPFi , contains all the hospitals that
are at least as preferred as her assigned hospital at µSO; i.e. if δi ∈ ΣPFi then16
h j ∈ H : h j ¥i µSO (si)
	∩ h j ∈ H : si  j ;	 ⊆ δi; (1)
The analysis of how students faced with Γ SR leads us to identify a focal point equilibrium
(Schelling, 1980) where each student selects all the hospitals that are at least as preferred
as that assigned to her by the Student-Optimal Stable matching; i.e. δ∗ is such that for each
si, δ
∗
i =

h j ∈ H : h j ¥i µSO (si)
	
.
Note that, since the notion of protective dominance involves all the possible orderings
in which the hospitals choose which students to enroll, as a consequence of Theorem 1
above, we can establish that the profile of strategies δ∗ (i.e., δ∗i =

h j ∈ H : h j ¥i µSO (si)
	
for each student si) is also a focal point equilibrium for a slight perturbation of Γ
SR. Here, the
students select the hospitals they would like to be enrolled in, having no information on the
ordering in which the hospitals will choose the students they enroll. When no student plays
strategies being protectively dominated (at some level), playing δ∗i is an optimal strategy for
each student, independent of the specific ordering the hospitals use to choose the students
they enroll in their programs.
16 To be precise, any student is free to include in her strategy any hospital which considers that this student
is inadmissible. Note that, since the hospital will never select this student, the final outcome of Γ SR is not
affected by the inclusion or not of the hospital in the student’s strategy.
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5 The Unbounded MIRC Mechanism
As Example 1 shows, the MIRC mechanism can result in unstable allocations when hospitals
act strategically. This example also points out that the limit of hospitals’ ability to enroll
students (no hospital can enroll more students than its quota determines) can be the origin
of such instability.
In this section we explore the agents’ behavior when faced with the MIRC mechanism,
but the ability of each student to select a hospital is not limited by its quota restriction. We
call this mechanism the Unbounded MIRC mechanism, UMIRC mechanism henceforth.
Relying on the description of the MIRC mechanism in Definition 3, the UMIRC mechanism
can be introduced as a modification of the former in which it is assumed that the quota
restrictions are not binding; i.e., q j ≥ n for each h j.
Definition 6 [The Unbounded MIRC Mechanism]
The UMIRC mechanism is the following sequential game, with n + 1 stages. The set of
players is S ∪H. Actions are selected according to these (sequential) rules:
(0) Each hospital h j selects an action σ j ⊆ S. This selection is simultaneously made by all
the hospitals. This information becomes public before proceeding to the next stage.
(1) Student s1, taking into account the actions already taken by all the hospitals, chooses
her action a1 ∈

h j ∈ H : s1 ∈ σ j
	∪ {s1}. Then, s1 is matched to ai; i.e. µUMIRC (s1) =
a1. This information becomes publicly known by the remaining students.
. . .
(`) Student s`, taking into account the actions taken by all the hospitals and the students
preceding her, chooses her action a` ∈

h j ∈ H : s` ∈ σ j
	 ∪ {s`}. Then, s` is matched
to a`; i.e., µ
UMIRC (s`) = a`. The remaining students are publicly informed about this.
Once all the agents have selected their actions, matching µUMIRC is obtained, as described
through stages (1) to (n) above.
5.1 Strategic Behavior and the UMIRC Mechanism
This section parallels the analysis developed in Section 3.1 for the MIRC mechanism. There-
fore, the arguments associated to the agents’ rationality when faced with the MIRC mecha-
nism are still valid in this section that concentrates in the UMIRC mechanism.
Note that, for a given vector of actions σ selected by the hospitals, the set of available
hospitals for student si at stage i, i = 1, . . . ,n, is
AU (si |σ ) =

h j ∈ H : si ∈ σ j
	∪ {si} ,
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which is independent of the other students’ selected actions.
Any rational student selects her preferred hospital (if any) on AU (si |σ ); i.e., each stu-
dent si seeking to maximize her utility, when faced with the UMIRC mechanism, chooses
action a∗i (σ) =B
 
AU (si |σ ) ;i

. Therefore, for any such student, µUMIRC (si) = a∗i (σ).
Since the hospitals can anticipate each student’s best-response to their actions, we can
identify the analysis of the equilibrium outcomes for the UMIRC mechanism with that for the
reduced game involving only the hospitals, which anticipate that students behave rationally.
Therefore, as argued in Section 3.1, we only need to restrict our analysis to the hospitals’
behavior when faced with the Unbounded Hospital-Reduced game, to be denoted as Γ UHR,
where hospitals are the players; the strategies for each hospital are the sets of students; and
associated to each vector of strategies,σ =
 
σ1, . . . ,σ j, . . . ,σm

there is a matching µUHR (σ)
assigning student si to her best available option,
µUHR (si;σ) =B
 
AU (si |σ ) ;i

.
Theorem 2 Let P be a problem. Then, game Γ UHR has an equilibrium if, and only if, C (P) 6=
;. Moreover, for each equilibrium for Γ UHR, say σ∗, µUHR (σ∗) ∈ C (P). Similarly, associated
to each µ ∈ C (P) there is an equilibrium for Γ UHR, say σ′, such that µ= µUHR (σ′).
Theorem 2 above points out that stable allocations are reached without imposing any
cooperation between the agents. This is, in part, derived from the sequentiality in which
agents take their decisions. Therefore, we can understand the equilibria of Γ UHR as the result
of a non-explicit (or hidden) cooperation between agents. Nevertheless, since the equilib-
rium is not unique, there is the risk of utility losses induced by a (possible) coordination
failure by hospitals.
6 Conclusions and Open Questions
This paper explores, from a game-theoretical point of view, the mechanism employed in
Spain to match medical graduates to residency programs in private hospitals. We observe
that this mechanism might select, as equilibrium outcomes, unstable matchings.
The lack of (guaranteed) stability motivates us to explore how agents behave when
faced with its dual mechanism, obtained from the MIRC mechanism by swapping the roles
of hospitals and students. It is remarkable that no hospital is (out of equilibrium) over-
occupied unless it exhibits an irrational behavior. This is because each hospital selects the
students it wants to enroll in its program, from the ones available. A detailed analysis of
the agents’ behavior, when faced with the DMIRC mechanism, guarantees that only stable
allocations can be expected when this mechanism is adopted. Furthermore, we detect a
focal point equilibrium yielding the Student-Optimal Stable matching.
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The focality of this equilibrium is maintained for a wide diversity of mechanisms shar-
ing a common structure: Students simultaneously select the hospitals whose residency pro-
grams they feel are admissible and then, hospitals sequentially choose the students they
enroll from those still available. The difference between these mechanisms is determined
by the order in which the hospitals make their choice, and the moment at which this or-
der is publicized, in particular for our purpose, the specific order, and whether the students
know it before selecting their strategy or it is decided once the students’ strategies have
been settled are irrelevant. The reason is that, when the students choose their (protectively
undominated) strategies, they are protecting against any eventually “unfavorable” ordering
in which the hospitals make their decisions.
For the sake of completeness, we also explore a variant of the MIRC mechanism in which
residency programs over-occupancy is allowed. Its adoption guarantees that, under respon-
siveness, only stable allocations can be reached. Nevertheless, since the set of stable out-
comes of a given problem can be large, the lack of agents’ coordination when faced with the
UMIRC mechanism might induce welfare losses.
A further aspect that could be relevant to clarify relies with a robustness analysis of the
mechanisms. The common structure shared by the MIRC, the DMIRC and the UMIRC is
that agents in a side of the market (the proposers) simultaneously select the agents in the
opposite side with whom they would like to sign a contract. Then, the agents in the opposite
side (the receivers) decide which contracts (if any) to sign. This sequential structure allows
to guarantee that each receiver has a dominant strategy. And the essence of this strategy
does not depend on the order in which the receivers evaluate the proposals: they just select
their preferred proposal among the ones that are still available. Nevertheless, the order in
which the receivers take their decisions might be relevant for the proposers to select which
strategy to play. Therefore, the question that we deal with is the following. Imagine that
the proposers do not know the exact order in which the receivers will act. Then, should the
proposers’ strategies depend on their uncertainty about the order in which the receivers act?
Note that, when faced to the DMIRC mechanism, we argued that students’ strategies should
satisfy condition (1), which is independent from the order in which the hospitals select
their students. Therefore, we can say that the DMIRC mechanism is robust with respect
to the order in which the hospitals play, and also with respect to any misinformation by
the students about this order. A similar assertion can be made for the UMIRC because for
any two orders describing how the students play, say pi and pi′, and each strategy played
by the hospitals, say σ, µUHR
pi
(σ) = µUHR
pi′ (σ). This holds because the number of students
that can be assigned to each hospital is unbounded. Nevertheless, for the case of the MIRC
mechanism, since hospitals cannot admit a number of students exceeding their quota, we
cannot guarantee that the hospitals strategies were independent from the order in which
students act. This lack of robustness might have negative implications in terms of welfare
when the hospitals exhibit some uncertainty about the exact order in which the students
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will made their selection.
To conclude, we want to propose some open questions that might deserve future re-
search.
6.1 DMIRC vs. Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism
The NRMP adopted in 1998 the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism. As Ma (2010, Theorem
6) points out, it is expected that the outcome is either unstable or it is the Hospital-Optimal
Stable matching. So the hospitals’ strategic behavior means that the main objective of mo-
tivating the reform undertaken in 1998 -to reach a Student-Optimal Stable matching- is
barely reached. The adoption of a stable matching mechanism within this framework has a
potential additional problem, which has not been considered in this paper and, as far as we
know, has not been addressed yet by any author.
Sönmez (1997) pointed out that, when faced with a stable mechanism, the hospitals
have two sources of strategic behavior: their preferences, and their quotae. In Ma (2010),
as well as in the present paper, the quotae by the hospitals are considered as given. It
could be that the results by Ma (2010) fail to be valid when the hospitals also exhibit a
strategic behavior when declaring their quotae. Nevertheless, our Theorem 1 is immune to
such a behavior. The reason is that in our description of the DMIRC mechanism no hospital
is required to announce its quota. Note that, since the DMIRC mechanism is not a stable
mechanism, Theorem 1 in Sönmez (1997) does not apply.
Therefore, the adoption of the DMIRC mechanism exhibits some advantages related to
the application of the of the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism. Since there is a general
difficulty of designing non-manipulable stable mechanism (Alcalde and Barberà, 1994), we
focus our comparison in terms of the simplicity of the mechanisms, as well as the outcomes
reached at equilibrium. Related to the simplicity of the two mechanisms, from the agents’
point of view, we think that it is barely arguable that the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism
is simpler than the DMIRC. Related to the properties exhibited by the equilibria outcomes
of the two mechanisms, the arguments above clarify the benefits of using the DMIRC mech-
anism instead of the Student-Optimal Stable mechanism.
6.2 Extensions
In the case of job matching markets (Kelso and Crawford, 1982), where salaries are a rel-
evant variable, the literature provides some results which are, in essence, similar to those
obtained for matching markets. Alcalde and Revilla (1999) illustrate that the lack of se-
quentiality in how the agents decide might induce instability. This instability can be avoided
either by assuming collusive behavior by the agents, when their actions are simultaneously
selected (Alcalde and Revilla, 1999, Theorem 4.2); or by resorting to sequential decisions
(Alcalde et al., 1998) and thus concentrating on Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria. These
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results are obtained under the assumption that firms’ preferences satisfy gross substitutabil-
ity.17 Therefore, a natural extension of our results comes from the analysis of sequential
mechanisms when institutions and individuals are not only worried about their matches
but also about the monetary transfers associated to their connection. In such a case, it
might be relevant to study agents’ behavior when gross substitutability is not fulfilled.
Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) propose a general framework where firms and workers
negotiate not only about salaries but also overall contractual terms. These authors pro-
pose a notion of substitutability to guarantee the existence of stable allocations. Recently,
Echenique (2012) found a close relationship between Hatfield and Milgrom’s substitutability
and Kelso and Crawford’s gross substitutability. Therefore, this connection suggests that the
results by Alcalde et al. (1998) can be adapted to the framework of matching with contracts.
What remains an interesting open question is whether, in a general setting of matching with
contracts, sequentiality helps to (stealthily) promote the agents’ coordination when select-
ing their strategies.
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APPENDIX
Proposition 1 establishes a simple way to identify some equilibria for Γ HR. As a consequence
of this result, each stable matching can be decentralized through some equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 1
Let P be a problem, and µ be a stable matching for P. Now, as stated in Proposition 1,
assume that each hospital h j, when faced with Γ
HR, selects strategy σ∗j = µ
 
h j

. Since
µ is stable, and thus individually rational, for each student si, µ (si) ¥i si. Therefore, by
construction, when hospitals select the strategies above, the set of achievable options for
student si is A (si |σ∗ ) = {µ (si) , si}, and thus µ= µHR (σ∗).
To demonstrate Proposition 1 we proceed by contradiction. Let us assume that σ∗ is not
an equilibrium for Γ HR. Then, there should be a hospital, say h j, and strategy for it, σ
′
j such
that
µHR

h j;

σ∗− j,σ
′
j
 j µHR  h j;σ∗= µ  h j . (2)
Since µ is individually rational, for each h j, Ch
 
µ
 
h j

; j

= µ
 
h j

. Therefore, condition
(2) above implies that
µHR

h j;

σ∗− j,σ
′
j
 \µHR  h j;σ∗ 6= ;.
Note that each student in µHR

h j;

σ∗− j,σ
′
j
 \ µHR  h j;σ∗ prefers her mate under
µHR

σ∗− j,σ
′
j

rather than her mate under µHR (σ∗), which coincides with her mate under µ.
This implies that h j and the (non-empty) set of students µ
HR

h j;

σ∗− j,σ
′
j
 \ µHR  h j;σ∗
block matching µ, contradicting that it was stable.

Proposition 2 establishes that, under responsiveness, each equilibrium for Γ HR yields an
individually rational matching with respect to the primitives of problem P.
Proof of Proposition 2
Recall that, given how the outcome of Γ HR is described, no student is assigned a hospi-
tal being worse -according her preferences- than her being unmatched option. There-
fore, if µHR (σ∗) fails to be individually rational, it must be a hospital h j such that
Ch
 
µHR
 
h j,σ
∗ ; j ( µHR  h j,σ∗.
For h j given, consider the alternative strategyσ
′
j =
¦
si ∈ µHR

h j;σ
∗
j

: {si}  j ;
©
, i.e. σ′j
is obtained by removing from µHR

h j;σ
∗
j

, the students being inadmissible for this hospital.
Therefore, µHR

h j,

σ∗− j,σ
′
j
 ⊆ µHR  h j,σ∗∩ si ∈ S : {si}  j ;	.
Note that, for each student si ∈ σ′j, h j ∈ A

si
σ∗− j,σ′j. Moreover, for each student,
her set of achievable options reduces when hospitals actions are

σ∗− j,σ
′
j

instead of σ∗,
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and h j ∈ A

si
σ∗− j,σ′j only for students in σ′j. This implies that µHR h j,σ∗− j,σ′j =
µHR
 
h j,σ
∗∩si ∈ S : {si}  j ;	 j µHR  h j,σ∗, which contradicts that σ∗ is an equilibrium
for Γ HR.

Proof of Proposition 3
Let P be a problem, and µ be a stable matching for P. Let us assume that, when faced
with Γ SR, each student si selects strategy δ
∗
i = µ (si). Since µ is pairwise stable, and
thus individually rational, for each hospital h j, µ
 
h j

= Ch
 
µ
 
h j

; j

. By construction,
when students select the strategies above, the set of achievable options for hospital h j is
AD
 
h j |δ∗

= µ
 
h j

, and thus µ= µSR (δ∗).
To prove Proposition 3 we proceed by contradiction. Let us assume that δ∗ above is not
an equilibrium for Γ SR. Then, there should be a student si, and strategy for her, δ
′
i such that
µSR
 
si;
 
δ∗−i,δ
′
i
i µSR (si;δ∗) = µ (si) . (3)
Since µ is individually rational, and thus µ (si) ¥i si, by transitivity µSR
 
si;
 
δ∗−i,δ
′
i
 ∈ H.
Let hi = µSR
 
si;
 
δ∗−i,δ
′
i

. Since si ∈ µSR
 
h j;
 
δ∗−i,δ
′
i

, si ∈ Ch
 
AD
 
h j |δ∗
∪ {si} ; j.
Therefore, the pair
 
si,h j

blocks µ, contradicting the pairwise stability of µ.

Note that Corollary 1 follows because any stable matching is also pairwise stable.
Proving Theorem 1
We now deal with proving Theorem 1. As previously anticipated in Section 4.1, to prove
this theorem we need some auxiliary, intermediate results. In what follows, we consider a
given problem P satisfying responsiveness.
Prior to introducing the auxiliary results, we introduce some useful notation. Let us
assume that each student si has to select a strategy in a restricted set Σ
′
i ⊆ Σi, so that each
profile of strategies is in the Cartesian product Σ′ =
∏n
i=1Σ
′
i. Then, hospital h j is available
for si if there is a profile of strategies δ ∈ Σ′ such that µSR (si;δ) = h j. O (si;Σ′) denotes the
set of available hospitals for student si, if any, when playing Γ
SR under the restriction that
the profiles of strategy belong to Σ′.
Our first result establishes that, under responsiveness, any equilibrium for Γ SR yields a
stable matching.
Lemma 4 Let P be a responsive problem, and δ∗ be an equilibrium for Γ SR. Then µSR (δ∗) ∈
C (P).
Proof
Assume that δ∗ is an equilibrium for Γ SR and, contrary to our statement, µSR (δ∗) is unstable
for P.
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First, note that µSR (δ∗) is individually rational. Since, by construction, each hospital
selects its best set of available students, then any lack of individual rationality must come
from some student. Assume that there is a student si such that si i µSR (si;δ∗). Then, by
selecting δ′i = ; she guarantees that si = µSR
 
si;
 
δ∗−i,δ
′
i
 i µSR (si;δ∗), which contradicts
that δ∗ is an equilibrium.
Since P is responsive, by Lemma 1, µSR (δ∗) must be pairwise unstable. Therefore, since
µSR (δ∗) is individually rational, there is a student-hospital pair
 
si,h j

blocking this match-
ing; i.e. h j i µSR (si;δ∗), and si ∈ Ch
 
µSR
 
h j;δ
∗∪ {si} ; j. Assume that, given the
strategies played by the remaining students, si plays δ
′
i =

h` ∈ H : h` ¥i h j
	
, and consider
the following cases, that exhaust all the possibilities:
(i) µSR (si;δ∗) = si. This implies that, when applying the DMIRC mechanism, and the
actions chosen by the students are δ∗, no hospital has selected si. When si selects δ′i
instead of δ∗i , there are two options.
(1) If si is an achievable student for h j then no hospital preceding h j has selected
si. This implies that for any k < j, µ
SR (hk;δ∗) = µSR
 
hk;
 
δ∗−i,δ
′
i

. When h j
has to choose its action, given that h j ∈ δ′i and si ∈ Ch
 
µSR
 
h j;δ
∗∪ {si} ; j,
h j includes si among the students it enrolls, that is si ∈ aD∗j
 
δ∗−i,δ
′
i

, and thus
h j = µSR
 
si;
 
δ∗−i,δ
′
i

. This means that δ∗ is not an equilibrium.
(2) If si is not an achievable student for h j then, when applying the DMIRC mech-
anism and si chooses action δ
′
i instead of δ
∗
i , there is some hospital hk, preced-
ing h j, such that si ∈ aD∗k
 
δ∗−i,δ
′
i

. Therefore, hk = µSR
 
si;
 
δ∗−i,δ
′
i

. Since
hk ∈ δ′i \

h j
	
, then hk i h j. Thus, by transitivity, µSR
 
si;
 
δ∗−i,δ
′
i

= hk i si =
µSR (si;δ∗), which means that δ∗ is not an equilibrium.
(ii) There is a successor for h j in the DMIRC mechanism, say h` with ` > j, such that
µSR (si;δ∗) = h`. Note that, since si ∈ Ch
 
µSR
 
h j;δ
∗∪ {si} ; j, it must be the case
that h j /∈ δ∗i . Therefore, the arguments provided in case (i) above can be replicated
to prove that δ∗ cannot be an equilibrium for Γ SR.
(iii) There is a hospital h`, preceding h j in the DMIRC mechanism, such that µSR (si;δ∗) =
h`. Since h j i h`, when si is faced with the DMIRC and selects δ′i instead of δ∗i ,
si /∈AD
 
h`
 δ∗−i,δ′i, and thus h` 6= µSR  si;  δ∗−i,δ′i.
It is straightforwardly verifiable that for each k < j
AD
 
hk
 δ∗−i,δ′i \ {si} ⊆AD (hk |δ∗ ) \ {si} .
Moreover, since (a) h j ∈ δ′i, (b) si ∈ Ch
 
µSR
 
h j;δ
∗∪ {si} ; j, and (c) preferences
 j are responsive, then either si ∈ µSR
 
h j;
 
δ∗−i,δ
′
i

, which contradicts that δ∗ is an
equilibrium; or si /∈ AD
 
h j
 δ∗−i,δ′i. Note that, the latter case implies that there is
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some hospital hr ∈ δ′i \

h j
	
such that si ∈ aD∗r
 
δ∗−i,δ
′
i

= µSR
 
hr;
 
δ∗−i,δ
′
i

. Since
hr i h j, this means that δ∗ is not an equilibrium.

We now deal with the analysis of which strategies are protectively dominated for each
student. Lemma 5 is very intuitive. It establishes that no student should include in her strat-
egy an inadmissible hospital. Then, Lemma 6 establishes that for each student, any strategy
not including her best achievable hospital is protectively dominated. Finally, Lemma 7 ex-
tends the idea of Lemma 6 to any ulterior set of profiles of strategies that are not erased
based on protective domination arguments.
From now on, for each student si, her set of strategies Σi is the set of all the possible
subsets of hospitals. Σ=
∏n
i=1Σi is the set of profiles of strategies.
Lemma 5 Let P be a responsive problem, and h j ∈ O (si;Σ) an achievable hospital for stu-
dent si such that si i h j, when playing Γ SR. Then, any strategy δi ∈ Σi such that h j ∈ δi is
protectively dominated.
Proof
Given strategy δi containing some achievable hospital being inadmissible for student si, let
δ′i the strategy for si containing only the hospitals in δi being admissible for this student;
i.e., δ′i =

h j ∈ δi : h j i si
	
. Note that for any permutation of the hospitals pi, and any
strategy for the remaining students, say δ−i,
(i) if µSR
pi
(si,δ)¥i si, then µSRpi
 
si,
 
δ−i,δ′i

= µSR
pi
(si,δ); and
(ii) if si i µSRpi (si,δ), then µSRpi
 
si,
 
δ−i,δ′i

¥i si i µSRpi (si,δ).
To conclude the proof, we just need to show that there is a profile of strategies, in which
si plays δi, and permutation pi, such that Γ
SR
pi
assigns to si an inadmissible hospital.
Let assume that hr is an achievable hospital for student si such that si i hr . Since
hr ∈ O (si;Σ), there is a profile of strategies δ ∈ Σ such that hr = µSR (si;δ), and thus
si ∈ aD∗r (δ). Since hr preferences are responsive, this implies that si h ;. Now, assume
that each student s` 6= si selects a strategy δ′` not including hr . This implies that, for any
permutation of the hospitals, say pi, µSR
pi
 
hr;
 
σ′−i,σi
 ⊆ {si}. Moreover, for any permuta-
tion pi′ such that pi′ (r) = 1, i.e. hr is the first hospital to choose in the DMIRC mechanism,
µSR
pi
 
si;
 
σ′−i,σi

= hr . 
Let Σ0i denote the restricted set of strategies for student si not containing any achiev-
able hospital that she considers inadmissible. The set of profiles of strategies where each
student’s strategy is in her restricted set of strategies Σ0i is denoted by Σ
0.
Lemma 6 Let P be a responsive problem. Assume that students play game Γ SR, and
each student si is restricted to select strategies in Σ
0
i . Then any strategy δi such that
B
 
O
 
si;Σ
0

;i

/∈ δi is protectively dominated for si.
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Proof
Assume that student si selects strategy δi not including B
 
O
 
si;Σ
0

;i

. Note that, in
particular, this implies that there is at least one hospital that si considers admissible.
18 Let
us assume that h j = B
 
O
 
si;Σ
0

;i

, and let denote δ′i = δi ∪

h j
	
. Since δi ∈ Σ0i , then
δ′i ∈ Σ0i . We now demonstrate that δ′i protectively dominates δi.
Note that the only difference between strategies δi and δ
′
i is the inclusion or not of
h j as an admissible hospital for student si. Therefore, for any strategy played by the
other students, say δ−i, and each permutation of the hospitals, say pi, either µSRpi (si;δ) =
µSR
pi
 
si;
 
δ−i,δ′i

or µSR
pi
 
si;
 
δ−i,δ′i

= h j i µSRpi (si;δ). Thus, we just need to show that
there is a permutation pi and some profile of strategies for the students other than si, say
δ′−i, under which si finds profitable to include h j as an admissible hospital.
Let δ′−i be a profile of strategies for students other that si such that, for all s` 6= si,
h j /∈ σ′` ∈ Σ0` . Let pi a permutation of hospitals satisfying that pi (1) = j. Since h j is
the first hospital to choose when the order is determined by pi, µSR
pi
 
h j;
 
δ′−i,δi

= ;,
whereas µSR
pi
 
h j;δ
′ = si. Therefore, since h j = B  O  si;Σ0 ;i, µSRpi (si;δ′) = hi i
µSR
pi
 
si;
 
δ′−i,δi

. 
Let Σ1i ⊆ Σ0i denote the restricted set of strategies for student si where each strategy
includes as acceptable the best achievable hospital for this student. Σ1 denotes the profiles
of strategies δ such that for each student si, δi ∈ Σ1i .
The idea underlying Lemma 6 above can be replicated in an iterative way; i.e., we can
describe for student s, Σ2i as her set of protectively undominated strategies, provided that
each student s` is restricted to select strategies in Σ
1
`
; and so forth. In general, for any t
> 1, Σti denotes the protectively undominated strategies for student si provided that the
remaining students are selecting strategies in Σt−1−i =
∏
6`=iΣt−1` .
The following result proposes a generalization for Lemma 6.
Lemma 7 Let P be a responsive problem. Assume that students play Γ SR, and each student
si is restricted to select strategies in Σ
t
i . Then any strategy δi such thatB (O (si;Σ
t) ;i) /∈ δi
is protectively dominated for si.
Proof
Note that the arguments provided in the proof of Lemma 6 above can be adapted to prove
this result.
Assume that h j = B (O (si;Σt) ;i) /∈ δi, and define δ′i = δi ∪

h j
	
. As argued in the
proof of Lemma 6, for each pi and any δ−i ∈ Σ−i, µSRpi
 
si;
 
δ−i,δ′i
 ∈ µSR
pi
(si;δ) ;h j
	
.
Now, consider strategies for students other than si, say δ
′
`
, such that for each s` 6= si,
h j ∈ δ′` if, and only if, h j ∈ δ` for all δ` ∈ Σt`.19 Then, for any pi such that pi (1) = h j,
µSR
pi
(si;δ′) = h j i µSRpi
 
si;
 
δ′−i,δi

. 
18 Otherwise, Σ0i must only contain the strategy δi = ;, and thus B
 
O
 
si;Σ
0

;i

= ;.
19 That is to include hi as an acceptable hospital is a necessary condition for δ
′` to be in Σt
`
.
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Recall that, under responsiveness, the Student-Optimal Stable matching is (weakly) ef-
ficient from the students’ point of view (Roth, 1985, Theorem 2∗). Therefore, the process
of an iterative elimination of protectively dominated strategies by applying Lemma 7 above
stops at the step T ,20 where for each student si all the strategies in Σ
T
i must contain µ
SO (si),
and eventually some hospitals being preferred to µSO (si) by si. In fact, we do not lose gen-
erality when assuming that the iterative application of Lemma 7 allows us to describe for
each student si a set of strategies Σ
T
i at which no strategy can be protectively dominated,
where for each σi ∈ ΣTi ,
h j ∈ H : h j ¥i µSO (si)
	 ⊆ δi ⊆ h j ∈ H : h j i si	 . (4)
As the following example illustrates, condition (4) is not necessary to describe the ‘limit’
set ΣT , because it might include, for some students, more hospitals than a necessary condi-
tion -derived from the iterative application of Lemma 7- imposes. Nevertheless, the unnec-
essary inclusion of some hospitals in a strategy to satisfy condition (4) above has no effect
on the outcome of the game Γ SR.
Example 3 Consider the following 6-student-3-hospital responsive problem, with S =
{a, b, c, d, e, f }, H = {1,2, 3}, with quotae q1 = 1, and q2 = q3 = 2. Agents’ preferences
are
a := 1, 2,3 d := 1,2, 3 1 =: d, f , b, e, c
b := 2, 1,3 e := 1,2, 3 2 =: c, a, f , b, d
c := 1, 2,3  f := 2,1, 3 3 =: a, b, d, e, f
The Student-Optimal Stable matching for P is
µSO :=
¨
a b c d e f
2 3 2 1 3 −
Condition (4) above, applied to f establishes that this student must select strategy δ∗f ={1,2, 3}. Nevertheless, the iterative deletion of protectively dominated strategies allows
student f to choose either δ∗f above or δ
′
f = {2, 3}. Note that, when describing Σ1, student
d must include 1 among her acceptable hospitals; i.e., {1} ⊆ δd for each δd ∈ Σ1d . Since
d is the preferred student for hospital 1, and this hospital is the first to select its students,
when the profiles of preferences have to be in Σ1, 1 becomes an unachievable hospital for
all the students other than d. This implies that for any t > 1, and any student other than d,
it is irrelevant that the student, when playing a strategy in Σti , includes 1 as an admissible
hospital or not.
Similarly, when considering condition (4), student a plays either strategy δa = {1,2, 3}
or δ′a = {1, 2}. Nevertheless, when applying Lemma 6 and then iteratively Lemma 7 nothing
20 I.e., by applying Lemma 7 we have that ΣT+1 = ΣT ( ΣT−1.
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is required about including hospital 1 as an acceptable hospital for student a. Note that,
since ; 1 a, hospital 1 is not available for student a, and thus it is irrelevant, for this
student, to consider whether to include 1 as an admissible hospital or not. 
Note that for each student si, and strategy for her δi ∈ ΣTi , if δi does not satisfy condition
(4) above is because the hospitals that are not listed in δi, but listed in any strategy fulfilling
(4), do not affect the final outcome as it is the cases of hospital 1 for either student f or
student a in the example above. This is why we say that no generality is lost when identifying
for any student a strategy in ΣTi and the requirement that condition (4) is fulfilled.
We can now provide a formal proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1
Consider a responsive problem P, and let µSO be its Student-Optimal Stable matching. Let us
assume that, when playing Γ SR, each student selects strategy δ∗i =

h j ∈ H : h j ¥i µSO (si)
	
.
Since each student’s strategy satisfies condition (4), none of them is employing a protectively
dominated strategy. It can also be seen that δ∗ constitutes an equilibrium for Γ SR, with
µSR (δ∗) = µSO.
Now, let us consider a protectively sophisticated equilibrium, say δ′, with µSR (δ′) 6=
µSR (δ∗) = µSO. Since σ′ is a PSE, without loss of generality, we can assume that for each
si ∈ S, δ∗i ⊆ δ′i. Moreover, by Lemma 4, µSR (δ′) is stable for P. Therefore, by Lemma
2, for each student si, either (a) µSR (si;δ′) = µSO (si), or (b) µSO (si) i µSR (si;δ′), where
condition (b) is fulfilled by, at least, one student.
When comparing matchings µSO and µSR (δ′), since the two matchings are stable, it is
well-known that for each si ∈ S, µSO (si) ∈ H if, and only if µSR (si;δ′) ∈ H, and for each si
fulfilling condition (b) above, µSR
 
h j;δ
′ j µSO  h j, for h j = µSO (si).21
Let h j1 be the hospital such that µ
SO
 
h j1
 6= µSR  h j1;δ′, and for each j < j1, µSO  h j =
µSR
 
h j;δ
′; and let si1 ∈ µSR  h j1;δ′ \ µSO  h j1. Since µSO  hi1 i1 µSR  hi1;δ′, it must be
the case that δ∗i1 ( δ′i1 .
Since δ′ is an equilibrium,
µSR

si1;

δ′−i1 ,δ
∗
i1

= si1 . (5)
Note that, otherwise, µSR

si1;

δ′−i1 ,δ
∗
i1

¥i1 µSO
 
si1
i1 µSR  si1;δ′, showing that δ′ is not
a SPE.
Note that, for each j′ < j1, µSR

h j′;

δ′−i1 ,δ
∗
i1

= µSO
 
h j′

= µSR
 
h j′;δ
′. Moreover, all
the students in µSO
 
h j1

are achievable by h j1 when applying the DMIRC mechanism and
the students’ actions are

δ′−i1 ,δ
∗
i1

. Therefore, since  j1 satisfy substitutability, for each
si′ ∈ µSR

h j1;

δ′−i1 ,δ
∗
i1
 \ µSO  h j1 and any si′′ ∈ µSO  h j1 \ µSR h j1;δ′−i1 ,δ∗i1, si′  j1 si′′ .
Thus, for each j′′ > j1 the following holds.
21 See Theorems 2.22 and 5.12 in Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
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(a) If µSR

hk;

δ′−i1 ,δ
∗
i1
 ∩ µSR  h j′′;δ′ = ; for each k < j′′, then µSR h j′′;δ′−i1 ,δ∗i1 =
µSR
 
h j′′;δ
′; and
(b) there is at most one student si′ ∈ µSR
 
h j′′;δ
′\µSR h j′′;δ′−i1 ,δ∗i1. Moreover, if such
a student exists, then µSR

si′′;

δ′−i1 ,δ
∗
i1

= hk for some k < j′′.
Therefore, by (5), there should be a hospital h j′ , with j′ > j1, such that eitherµSR h j′;δ′−i1 ,δ∗i1 < µSR  h j′;δ′ ≤ q j′ or there is a student si′ ∈ µSR h j′;δ′−i1 ,δ∗i1
such that µSO (si′) = si′ . Thus, there must be a student si2 ∈ µSO
 
h j′
 \ µSR h j′;δ′−i1 ,δ∗i1
such that si2 ∈ Ch

µSR

h j′;

δ′−i1 ,δ
∗
i1
∪ wi2	 ; j′.
Hence, by (b) above, there must be j2 < j′ such thatµSR
 
si2;δ
′= h j2 , and thus h j′ i2 h j2 .
Therefore, µSR

si2;

δ′−i2 ,δ
∗
i2
 6= h j2 . Consider the following two cases, that exhaust all the
possibilities,
(i) h j2 = h j1 . Then µ
SR

h j1;

δ′−i2 ,δ
∗
i2
\µSR  h j1;δ′= µSR h j1;δ′−i1 ,δ∗i1\µSR  h j1;δ′.
Therefore, for each hospital h j, j1 < j < j
′, AD

h j
δ′−i1 ,δ∗i1=AD h j δ′−i2 ,δ∗i2,
and thus h j′ = µSR

si2;

δ′−i2 ,δ
∗
i2

= µSO
 
si2
 i2 µSR  si2;δ′. This shows that δ′ is
not a SPE.
(ii) j1 < j2 < j′. Since δ′ is a SPE, then µSR

si2;

δ′−i2 ,δ
∗
i2

= si2 . Now, the arguments
related to h j1 can be replicated for h j2 .
Since the number of hospitals is finite, an iterative argument necessarily yields the existence
of a student, sik such that µ
SO
 
sik
ik µSR  sik ;δ′, and µSR sik ;δ′−ik ,δ∗ik= µSO  sik, show-
ing that δ′ is not a SPE.

Proof of Theorem 2
Let P be a problem, and σ∗ an equilibrium for Γ UHR. Let us assume that µUHR (σ∗) fails to
be stable for P.
First, note that µUHR (σ∗) ∈ IR (P). Since each student always selects her best achiev-
able option, µUHR (si;σ∗) ¥i si for each student si. Assume that there is some hospital,
say h j, such that Ch
 
µUHR
 
h j;σ
∗ ; j 6= µUHR  h j;σ∗. Then, when h j plays strategy
σ′j = Ch
 
µUHR
 
h j;σ
∗ ; j instead of σ∗j , it gets
µUHR

h j;

σ∗− j,σ
′
j

= Ch
 
µUHR
 
h j;σ
∗ ; j j µUHR  h j;σ∗ ,
showing that σ∗ is not an equilibrium.
Since µUHR (σ∗) is an individually rational matching for P, if it fails to be stable, there
should be a hospital, say h j and a set of students, S
′ ⊆ S, blocking µUHR (σ∗). Let us define
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σ′j = Ch
 
µUHR
 
h j;σ
∗∪ S′;h j. Note that, since  S′,h j blocks µUHR (σ∗), for any si ∈
S′, h j i µUHR (si;σ∗). Therefore, when faced with the UMIRC mechanism, for each si ∈
σ′j, a
∗
i

σ∗− j,σ
′
j

= B

AU

si
σ∗− j,σ′j ;i = h j, and thus µUHR h j;σ∗− j,σ′j = σ′j  j
µUHR
 
h j;σ
∗, showing thatσ∗ is not an equilibrium. Note that, in particular, it is also proven
that when C (P) = ;, no profile of strategies σ∗ constitutes an equilibrium for Γ UHR.
Now, let us consider a stable matching for P, say µ. Note that, when faced with the
UMIRC mechanism, if each hospital h j chooses action σ
′
j = µ
 
h j

, then the set of avail-
able options for student si is A
U (si |σ′ ) = µ (si) ∪ {si}. Therefore, since µ is stable
and thus individually rational, for each student si, B
 
AU (si |σ′ ) ;i

= µ (si). Hence, for
σ′ =

σ′1, . . . ,σ
′
j, . . . ,σ
′
m

, µUHR (σ′) = µ.
Assume that σ′ above is not an equilibrium for Γ UHR. Then, there must be a hospi-
tal, say h`, and strategy for it σ
′′
`
such that µUHR
 
h`;
 
σ′−`,σ
′′
`
 ` µUHR (h`;σ′) = µ (h`).
Since µ is individually rational, this implies that there is a non-empty set of students
S′ = µUHR
 
h`;
 
σ′−`,σ
′′
`
\µUHR (h`;σ′) such that for each si ∈ S′, h` i µ (si).22 This implies
that (S′,h`) blocks µ, contradicting its stability.

22Note that h` was not achievable for students in S
′ when faced with the UMIRD mechanism and each
hospital h j action was σ
′
j . Nevertheless, when the action by h` shifts to σ
′′`, h` becomes the best achievable
option for students in S′.
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